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Abstract— Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are emerging as
enablers for supporting many applications and services, such
as precision agriculture, search and rescue, temporary network
deployment or coverage extension, and security. UAVs are being
considered for integration into emerging 5G networks as aerial
users or network support nodes. We propose to leverage UAVs in
5G to assist in the prevention, detection, and recovery of attacks
on 5G networks. Specifically, we consider jamming, spoofing,
eavesdropping and the corresponding mitigation mechanisms that
are enabled by the versatility of UAVs. We introduce the hot zone,
safe zone and UAV-based secondary authorization entity, among
others, to increase the resilience and confidentiality of 5G radio
access networks and services. We present simulation results and
discuss open issues and research directions, including the need for
experimental evaluation and a research platform for prototyping
and testing the proposed technologies.
Index Terms—5G and beyond, wireless security, privacy, UAV
communications, drones, cellular networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communications have gone through decades of
innovation. Cellular communications networks have provided
true mobile broadband services since the deployment of the
4G long-term evolution (LTE). 5G networks will enable new
use cases beyond mobile broadband where low latency, high
reliability or massive connectivity is needed.
5G encompasses many networking principles, from base
station-controlled to ad hoc networking. All of these share
the common requirement that peers or network support nodes
need to be trustworthy. Otherwise, a user may give away
personal information to unauthorized entities, accept wrong
information, receive degraded service, or waste resources.
Security encompasses a series of attributes that are required
for a communications system to protect users, messages and
services from being exploited, misused or blocked. Wireless
communications systems are especially vulnerable because
information is signaled over the air and cannot be completely
shielded.
Security has not been at the foundation of wireless commu-
nications technology development, but is becoming increas-
ingly important. Since 5G systems will be extensive, complex,
customizable and to a large extent software defined, these
systems will have a larger attack surface than 4G networks.
They will also be more attractive to attacks since they will
be providing critical services. Despite dedicated specifications
that establish the 5G security framework, researchers have
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already found important deficiencies and potential security
vulnerabilities [1].
Some of the main threats to cellular networks are founded
on the trust relationship between a user equipment (UE) and
the network. Specifically, a UE follows the instructions coming
from the base station. Many control signals are sent in the clear
and can be easily reproduced for launching spoofing attacks.
5G allows null encryption and the network can decide to use
it. whether to use encryption or not. Hence, eavesdropping is
possible not only for capturing control information, but also
user data. The network can request 5G users to provide loca-
tion updates or their globally unique Subscription Permanent
Identifier (SUPI); a fake base station can leverage this. 5G can
encrypt the SUPI, but there may be instances where this is not
implemented [1].
The reliance on a number of control channels and signals
enables efficient and tailored 5G network implementations.
While the 4G signaling frame is structured, the control signals
and channels can be personalized in 5G. Nevertheless, if these
are disturbed, the system performance will greatly suffer be-
cause admission control, resource allocation, link adaptation,
and so forth depend on them. Hence, it is important to harden
5G systems against eavesdropping, spoofing, and jamming.
While it is important that security be considered during the
system design, as cellular standards and use cases evolve, it
is impossible to foresee all threats. Security thus needs to be
considered during the design and operation. In this paper, we
discuss new opportunities and challenges of using unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs) for increasing the availability and
privacy of 5G services.
Massive deployments of UAVs require coordination through
radio signaling. For example, UAVs need to report their pres-
ence and communicate with other UAVs, terrestrial networks
and ground users. Several working groups of the Third Gener-
ation Partnership Project are developing the specifications for
integrating UAVs into cellular networks. A network-connected
UAV can be a UE, a communications relay, or an aerial
base station [2]. These and other standardization efforts are
in response to the increasing availability of UAVs and the
emerging use cases and services they will enable in many areas
important to society, including emergency response, trans-
portation, delivery, precision agriculture, and entertainment
[3].
The research community has been looking into physical
layer security approaches to ensure the confidentiality and
security of 5G networks [4] [5]. The work presented in [6]
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2discusses how a UAV-assisted system can be used for physical
layer security enhancements of advanced cellular networks
along with the different challenges that exist. Most of the
existing works limit their focus on passive eavesdropping
attacks, which is only one of many wireless system attacks.
Our contributions in this paper can be summarized as follows:
• We provide a broader discussion of radio frequency (RF)
attacks on 5G and beyond networks.
• We propose different ways of using UAVs, individually or
in groups, for enhancing the 5G cellular network security
in three phases: prevention, detection, and recovery from
fundamental wireless attacks.
• We present illustrative use cases with numerical results
that show the potential benefits of the proposed mecha-
nisms.
• We discuss the important open issues and research direc-
tions.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we elabo-
rate on a variety of emerging and new technologies for UAVs
to prevent RF attacks to 5G networks, or help with the attack
detection and recovery. Section III presents three relevant case
studies with numerical results. Section IV provides an outlook
on research, and Section V draws the conclusions.
II. UAV-ASSISTED ATTACK PREVENTION, DETECTION
AND RECOVERY
5G networks are expected to support reduced latency, sig-
nificantly more users and throughput, and a high level of
reliability. Therefore, it is necessary now more than ever to
ensure 5G networks are safe from potential attacks. Networks
must be built with prevention mechanisms in place to stop
attacks from having a chance to significantly degrade the
network. Attack prevention can generally be done by (1)
hardening the system to make attacks infeasible or unattractive
or by (2) effectively taking preventive countermeasures to be
able to absorb potential future attacks. For attacks that cannot
be prevented, the first phase of system resilience is the ability
to detect abnormal behavior.
Multiple challenges exist when attempting to detect an
ongoing attack. Once the presence of an attack is acknowl-
edged, it is important to understand what type of attack
is occurring. Once the attack type is recognized, a proper
recovery procedure can be employed.
After a network attack happens and is identified, recovery
mechanisms need to step in as quickly and effectively as
possible to minimize the damage. A recovery procedure may
focus on improving the network quality for users without
disabling the attacker, or focus on reducing the effectiveness
of an attacker, such that it no longer has a influence on the
network. Table I presents a summary of various prevention,
detection, and recovery techniques that can be used by a UAV-
assisted framework to augment the security of 5G networks.
Irrespective of the 5G waveform or frequency band, securing
the wireless access is critical and we therefore propose UAVs
in different roles, agnostic to the specific 5G physical layer
or service. A selection of the approaches listed in Table I are
displayed in bold and will be discussed in further detail in
Fig. 1: Illustration of eavesdropping prevention through UAV-
assisted safe zone
this section. It is important to mention that UAVs have flight
restrictions and are power-limited, in general. Therefore, some
of the proposed techniques may be particularly suitable as
temporary solutions for critical scenarios, where high-value
resources must be protected.
A. Eavesdropping
Eavesdropping is a privacy and confidentiality attack. It
occurs when personal data is captured illegitimately. Eaves-
dropping is only effective if the eavesdropper observes a
good signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at its receiver and the data
is unencrypted, or the eavesdropper is able to decrypt it.
Eavesdropping is a passive attack, but can be combined with
an active attack to improve the data interception performance.
Safe zones: The passive nature of eavesdropping attacks
means that most of these attackers will be difficult to locate,
and may remain unnoticed. Hence, we propose an attack pre-
vention technique that offers proactive protection for the trans-
ferred information without prior knowledge of the existence
and locations of eavesdroppers. A safe zone is a protected
area around the legitimate node where a UAV or UAV swarm
transmits artificial noise (AN) [5] in different directions around
the user to mask the user signal and prevent information
leakage. This is illustrated in Fig. 1. In such case, the geometry
of the communications peers and angles of arrival/departure
of the wireless link need to be known or discovered for
producing AN in strategic directions. The beamwidth of the
AN transmission and the number of UAVs involved will
determine the level of protection against eavesdropping. This
approach can be combined with beamforming between the
base station and UE, or with a UAV relay discussed later.
The selection of the 3D position of a UAV, the type of RF
transmission and trajectory can potentially protect multiple
ground users against eavesdropping. Safe zones can protect
3TABLE I: UAV-assisted attack prevention, detection and recovery techniques. The bold entries are elaborated in this paper.
Category Attack Prevention Attack Detection Attack Recovery
Eavesdropping • UAV artificial noise transmission,
creating safe zones
• Coordination of safe zones and UAV
relaying: create a safe zone and use a
UAV relay to transport information in
and out of the safe zone
• Sensing and monitoring, using
UAVs with RF and non-RF sensors
for eavesdropper localization: use
a non-coherent energy detector for
detection of local oscillator leak-
age from an eavesdropper’s RF
front-end as well as cameras, etc.
• UAV relaying
• Joint resource allocation and
UAV trajectory optimization: limit
rate while in the attack region using
UAVs
Jamming • Multipoint transmission, including
UAV relaying and UAV base stations
located closer to the users: instead of
using one single link that can be at-
tacked easily, provide multiple links,
or hops using UAVs to minimize the
effect of jamming attacks
• Beamforming and dynamic relaying,
by repositioning UAVs proactively:
the nulling beamformer can be used to
attenuate transmissions from certain
angles
• RF environment sensing and
processing with UAVs
• UAV-assisted localization of
jammers: monitoring high power
beams with a single UAV, or a
UAV swarm, can help minimize
the search area and the search time
because of their 3D mobility and
authonomy.
• UAV relaying
• Hot zones enabled by redundant
UAV points of transmission or re-
ception
Spoofing • UAV-enabled secondary
authorization
• UAV-originating secondary signal
sources
• RF environment awareness
with distributed UAVs
• Virtual channel modeling: model
the channel under abnormal and
normal conditions to distinguish
between normal behavior and a
spoofing attack
• Cooperative localization using
UAVs: UAVs distributed to identify
inconsistencies with the authenticated
node information
• Multi-hop transmission: provide
higher power focused transmissions
closer to the affected nodes
groups of users and the information and AN transmissions
can even be coordinated to produce the best results while
optimizing resources. For a scalable solution, terrestrial and
aerial nodes of different types can be combined. Specifically,
high altitude platforms, which can stay aloft longer and carry
more payload to possibly create multiple directional beams
using advanced antenna technology, should be considered.
Mobile UAV relay and resource allocation: UAV relays
can be deployed close to the user to lower the transmission
power while still maintaining a high SNR. Reference [6] dis-
cusses the joint resource allocation and trajectory optimization
to avoid eavesdroppers. The trajectory design focuses on the
position of the UAV relative to the legitimate users and eaves-
droppers, whereas resource allocation and, specifically, power
control can further improve the effectiveness. We propose
to leverage the physical environment together with the 3D
mobility of UAVs and adjust the UAV speed and transmission
parameters in such a way to maximize the user data rate at
minimum transmission power and so minimize the information
leakage. Together, these techniques allow the UAV to provide
a strong link by focusing on the legitimate user locations while
reducing the effectiveness of eavesdropping. This is illustrated
in Fig. 2. However, in contrast to other research that assumes
the eavesdropper locations are known or can be estimated,
in Section III.A we show that even if the locations of the
eavesdroppers are unknown, this technique can significantly
lower the eavesdropping attack performance.
B. Jamming
Jamming occurs when RF interference is deliberately cre-
ated in order to degrade a service or prevent devices in a
network to communicate with one another. As a result, a base
station or set of users impacted by a jamming attack will
typically experience degraded service or denial of service.
UAV-based jammer hunting: UAVs can locate unknown
signal sources much quicker than ground vehicles and without
human intervention. Jamming, which can cause major system
degradation over time while being undetected, will become
less attractive if it can be detected and localized early.
The work presented in [7] proposes two reactive jamming
detection mechanisms based on node collaboration. The first
technique is a distributed approach where all nodes collect
the performance metrics from all other connected nodes and
then compare these to identify abnormal behavior. The second
technique, uses a central node that gathers all performance
metrics and compares these with a predefined value or thresh-
old to identify any affected node or area. Both approaches
4Fig. 2: Illustration of eavesdropping recovery through UAV-
assisted aerial relay
Fig. 3: Illustration of jamming detection through UAV-based
jammer hunting.
can be effectively implemented with UAVs. UAVs can provide
appropriate 3D sensing coverage to enhance terrestrial RF-
based detection and localization of jammers and improve
the measurement accuracy. UAVs can be used as pre-sensor
stations equipped with powerful RF spectrum sensing capa-
bilities for locating jammers or any high-power signal sources
and obtaining their beam directionality and other transmission
parameters as depicted in Fig. 3. A swarm of UAVs can be
deployed in different directions if there is no prior information
about jammers [8]. The collected information will be fed into
a range-based or range-free method to localize the attacker.
For the range-based method, the distance to the jammer is
estimated with the help of physical measurements such as
time difference of arrival, received signal strength, and time
Fig. 4: Illustration of jamming recovery through UAV-based
hot zone.
of arrival. The range free techniques depend on the geometric
characteristics of the affected area to localize the jammer.
The strength of using UAVs for jammer hunting is their
ability to track the movement of mobile jammers. The change
of location of a mobile jammer may trigger a new interference
detection campaign using traditional methods and during this
time the cellular network performance will suffer. The UAVs
can tag the RF fingerprint of a jammer or use visual sensors
to identify a jammer, observe its operation, and track its
movement to devise and adapt the recovery mechanisms in
real-time, or even predict them.
Hot zones: Most anti-jamming contributions apply nulling,
frequency hopping, or signal processing to minimize the effect
of jamming [9]. These approaches can be effective in the
case of static or traditional jamming attacks, but may be less
suitable against smart or dynamic jammers. The technique that
we propose minimizes the effect of jamming at the victim node
through redundant transmissions from one or more deployed
UAVs to create hot zones. As opposed to transmitting AN
against eavesdroppers, the same UAV(s) can retransmit the
source signals of the legitimate transmitter for enhancing the
signal strength at the legitimate receiver as illustrated in Fig. 4.
UAVs are suitable for multipoint transmission since they
can establish line of sight (LoS) links to source and sink com-
munications nodes and get close to the affected transceivers
for optimal channel and signal conditions. The strategic 3D
deployment and trajectory of UAVs can enhance the ground
users’ achieved rates while minimizing interference, provided
tight synchronization can be established and maintained. Nu-
merical results are provided in Section III.B. A UAV, or UAV
swarm, can create one or more hot zones by transmitting
to one or more ground users in the region of the attack.
This technique can be combined with advanced multiple-input,
multiple-output, beamforming and space-division multiple ac-
cess techniques to optimize and isolate resources used by
5terrestrial and UAV-based transmissions. For the case where
one or more base stations are affected by strong jammers, UAV
base stations can be strategically positioned and take over the
radio access network functionalities.
C. Spoofing
RF spoofing attacks occur in the form of signals or channels
that are meant to deceive the network or users, disrupt com-
munications or gain access to information or services. GPS
spoofing, in particular, occurs when an attacker provides fake
coordinates or a fake time reference.
UAV-based secondary authentication: A single authenti-
cation mechanism and authority can be improved by adding
a second form of authentication, which is already in use
today for many IT services. As opposed to user-centric dual
authentication, we propose a network-centric solution assisted
by UAVs. It is based on dual authentication, where the com-
putationally complex authentication mechanisms are carried
out by the terrestrial 5G network and the credibility check
is carried out by a UAV. The process begins when a new
node is discovered by a UAV scout. The scout will then start
collecting the device’s information, such as location, type of
device, and channel state information. Such information can
be valuable for authentication, as shown in [10], but instead of
estimating the physical layer information, the UAV can capture
and transfer it to the terrestrial 5G network and use it when the
device initiates the authentication process with the network.
UAV signal source: New modes of mobile communications,
such as cellular-based vehicle to everything (C-V2X), heavily
rely on the GPS signal as the synchronization source. This
has been identified as a bottleneck from both the security
and GPS availability standpoints. UAVs can mimic the global
positioning system at local scale and provide accurate posi-
tioning information. Using standard cooperative localization
mechanisms, a node may determine its location incorrectly
if any of the three UAVs that is used for estimating the
relative distances has been compromised. Additional UAVs
will provide more robustness for the location estimation as
well as for identifying compromised nodes and providing them
a reliable source [11].
UAVs can also be effectively used to relay the GPS signals
to network users because their mobility allows consistent LoS
links with satellites as well as with ground users. A UAV
relay can serve as the reference for a cluster of users that
may be moving together, for instance, in a train [12]. Fig. 5
illustrates the use of UAV-assisted signal source techniques
to provide an authenticated GPS signal. The relayed GPS
signal can be used to determine if a fake GPS signal has
been transmitted. In addition, the UAV positions, trajectories
and the associated channel states can be used explicitly as
physical attributes for verifying traditional signal sources on
the fly. Those aids can be thought of as a form of prevention,
or detection and mitigation if an attack has already happened.
UAV-based signal sources do not need to be present all the
time; they can be effectively leveraged where available and
combined with other signal spoofing countermeasures, such
as internal signal distribution among authenticated nodes, or
verified anchors.
Fig. 5: UAV-assisted authentication and GPS signal source.
UAV-based RF environment sensing: UAVs can assist
in creating awareness of the radio environment. A UAV or
distributed UAV swarm collects and processes RF data as
5G signaling inspectors to monitor operation and detect any
unusual RF activity in the band, such as duplicated control
signals or excessive RF activity. These observer UAVs will
know the locations and operational parameters of legitimate
network nodes and can observe (1) the general RF signaling
activity and compare it to prior data as well as (2) the control
signaling activity. If the legitimate control frames, which can
be dynamically configured by the 5G network, are unknown
at the UAV, the UAV needs to be updated accordingly to
facilitate identifying non-conforming or fake signals. This
same technique can also be used to detect protocol-aware
jammers that try to hide within one or more 5G physical
channels or signals. Once the spoofing area is identified, it
can be isolated and UAV relays deployed to overpower fake
signals, retake control of users, or reestablish services using
other resources.
GPS spoofing attacks can be detected and mitigated through
RF crowd sourcing among terrestrial and aerial nodes. In order
to aid in this process, the legitimate nodes can exchange
location and time information among themselves and the
observer UAVs to identify compromised nodes [13], inform
the nodes being compromised, and provide alternative signal
sources as previously described.
III. CASE STUDIES
A. Eavesdropping Attack Prevention
When passive attackers start listening and capturing packets
exchanged between base stations and legitimate users through
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Fig. 6: Case study for eavesdropping prevention—secrecy rate
achievable with an aerial relay, through base station handover,
and none of them.
wiretap links, the system confidentiality and privacy are com-
promised. The extent to which the confidentiality of the system
is compromised can be measured through the secrecy rate, the
transmission rate at which no information will be decoded
by the eavesdropper, and can be calculated as the difference
between the legitimate and the wiretap channel capacities
[4]. The secrecy rate is commonly used to evaluate the per-
formance of eavesdropping mitigation techniques. Therefore,
it has been adopted as a key performance indicator in our
simulations.
We have simulated the secrecy rate of a mobile user that
moves at constant speed in one direction and passes two
eavesdroppers along its trajectory. A UAV is available for
relaying the data from the base station to the user. The location
of the 1st and 2nd base stations are at (0,0,30) and (1400,0,30)
coordinates, respectively. The two eavesdroppers are located
at (250,0,0) and (500,0,0), respectively. The initial position of
the ground nodes is (0,0,0). The user moves on a straight
line from base station 1 to 2. The UAV relay will follow
the ground user closely at 20 m height. The base station
power is 43 dBm while the UAV relay power is 23 dBm.
The channel noise is characterized as a normal distribution
with a variance of 1e-12. The downlink communications signal
bandwidth is 10 MHz. For ground communications, we
consider both distance dependent large-scale fading and small-
scale fading for the channel model. We use a common air-to-
ground channel model [14] that is composed of LoS signals,
non-LoS signals, and multiple reflected components, which
cause multi path fading, to calculate the data rates between
UAV and ground receivers. The secrecy rate is calculated here
for the downlink and is obtained as the difference between
the achieved rate at the legitimate user from the base station,
or UAV relay, and the maximum achieved rate at the two
eavesdropper nodes. Fig. 6 compares the secrecy rate at the
UE for three cases: single base station transmission, single
base station transmission with UAV relay, and optimal base
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Fig. 7: Case study for jamming recovery—achievable rate
with/without a ground jammer and with/without a UAV-based
hot zone.
station handover in the sense of the secrecy rate. We observe
important performance improvement when using a UAV relay.
B. Jamming Attack Recovery
Jamming attacks can severely degrade the cellular network
system performance and the communications capability be-
tween authenticated users. Earlier we proposed using UAVs to
create hot zones as a recovery mechanism. The next scenario
considers a moving ground user that is connected to one
base station. The jammer schedules its resource and beam
directions to attack this user, while one UAV will be deployed
to create the hot zone. It creates another point of transmission
to enhance the received signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio
(SINR) at the ground receiver while the jammer aims at
degrading it. The receiver will apply equal gain combining as a
receiver diversity technique to combine the transmissions from
the base station and the UAV. The UAV will closely follow the
movement of the ground user. The simulation parameters used
here are equivalent to those used in Sec. III-A. The jammer
location is (500,0,0) and its transmission power 15 dBW. The
results shown in Fig. 7 illustrate the achieved downlink rate at
the UE. We observe that deploying the hot zone increases the
SINR to considerably lower the effect of jamming. Also, the
results show how the system starts recovery and how the rate
starts to increase as the user moves away from the jammer.
Both scenarios are scalable to multiple UEs with a single or
multiple UAVs through resource sharing or advanced wireless
technologies, as indicated in Section IV.
C. UAV-based Attack and Recovery
Integrating UAV devices in future cellular networks may
also expose the latter to potential risks of UAV-based attacks.
Cellular-connected UAVs may undergo radio propagation char-
acteristics that are likely to be different from those experi-
enced by a ground user. Once a UAV is flying well above
7Fig. 8: UAV generating strong interference to terrestrial cells and users.
cellular base stations, its uplink signal becomes more visible
to multiple cells due to favorable line of sight propagation
conditions [3]. As a result, UAVs are capable of creating
significant interference to many neighboring cells receiving
uplink transmissions from their legacy ground users. This is
depicted in Fig 8.
It is therefore critical for the cellular network to (i) detect
and identify the threat posed by a UAV interfering and
disrupting the service of nearby cells, and (ii) mitigate it.
As for detection, the interfered base stations could assist the
aggressor base station—i.e., the one to which the aggressor
UAV is associated with—by reporting the levels of inter-
ference received on certain time-frequency resource blocks.
Once detected, the threat can be addressed as follows: In
the case of a rogue UAV, e.g., a mobile phone attached to
a UAV and unauthorized to receive cellular service in the sky,
the aggressor base station could stop allocating it resources
and force the user to disconnect until it lowers its height.
In the case of an authorized UAV user, the aggressor base
station could still allow it to transmit while managing the
interference it generates. This can be accomplished through
inter-cell coordination, by having dedicated resources for the
UAV, which will not be used by nearby cells for their ground
users, or by employing UAV-specific power control, where the
UAV will lower its transmit power to reduce the interference
it causes.
IV. RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Fundamental challenges are still to be tackled for UAV-
assisted network security to take off, in both the theoretical
and experimental domains. In what follows, we identify what
we believe are among the most compelling research directions
to follow.
• 5G platforms for R&D: The proposed UAV-assisted se-
curity enhancements need to be implemented and tested
in production-like operating environments. Real data that
captures diverse modes of operation, with and without
attacks, need to be made available for R&D as benchmarks
for reproducing experiments and real use-cases to assess
research innovations. On the technology side, this requires
robust 5G platforms and configurable radios that act as
attackers, relays, or enhanced 5G network nodes. On the
regulatory side, it needs (i) permissions to radiate in the
RF spectrum from federal spectrum authorities and license
holders, and (ii) to either adhere to the established UAV
flight operation rules or to be granted special permissions
from federal aviation authorities.
• UAV experimental platforms: UAVs have important lim-
itations in terms of endurance, payload size and weight,
and operation. Designed under the Platforms for Advanced
Wireless Research program, the Aerial Experimentation and
Research Platform for Advanced Wireless (AERPAW) will
cover the previously mentioned technological and regula-
tory aspects that are needed to operate a 5G testbed with
UAVs [15]. It will offer global researchers the ability to
prototype and test advanced wireless technology for emerg-
ing UAV applications, giving them access to experimental
base stations and UAVs that communicate via 5G and
software-defined radio (SDR) networks. Modern SDRs will
be deployed on the fixed towers and lightweight versions
will be carried by the UAVs, both implementing advanced
wireless protocols. A number of UAVs will be available,
including long endurance UAVs. The use of SDRs will
allow implementing, adjusting and enhancing the proposed
techniques and evaluating scalability and the impact of
limited resources in real urban, suburban, and rural deploy-
ments. Advanced wireless technology, such as directional
transmission and reception at the UAV and attack-aware
scheduling, can be investigated with AERPAW to further
improve the proposed mechanisms and effectively increase
the capacity of UAVs in their envisaged roles.
• Data analytics for security: Past messages, physical and
environmental attributes, and information collected by mul-
tiple UAV sensors can be used to validate messages, weigh
decisions, and dynamically update node and information
trust metrics. Cross-discipline research is needed at the
crossroads of computer vision, formal methods and com-
munications to jointly process data from different sensors
and maximize the effect of the proposed communications-
centric mitigation approaches.
V. CONCLUSIONS
While the first 5G networks are being deployed, researchers
have already identified important security threats. The 5G
framework offers strong security mechanisms, but even if
all are rigorously implemented, attackers will find a way to
disturb 5G operations or gain illegitimate access to services
or information. With the premise that 5G terrestrial networks
will never be 100% secure, we proposed to leverage UAVs
for enhancing the security of 5G and beyond wireless access
networks. UAVs are currently being considered as 5G users
8and network support nodes and will naturally be available
for assisting terrestrial networks. We discussed several areas
where the diversity and 3D mobility of UAVs can effectively
enhance advanced wireless network security against a number
of eavesdropping, jamming, and spoofing attacks, before they
happen or for rapid detection and recovery. Simulation results
showed the potential benefits of the proposed mechanisms
using low-altitude aerial points of transmission. It is important
to note that the UAV-enhanced or enabled security services
need to be robust and secure to avoid introducing new vulner-
abilities. Wide scale testing with advanced wireless testbeds
featuring terrestrial 5G networks, SDRs and UAVs will allow
prototyping and testing in order to understand the operational
parameters, impact and practical limitations of UAV-assisted
5G network security.
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